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 HOW DO START-UPS OBTAIN THEIR LEGAL SERVICES? 
DARIAN M. IBRAHIM* 
 
   This Essay is the first to examine, using responses to online surveys, 
the use of in-house versus outside counsel by rapid-growth start-up 
companies. It also explores, from the vantage point of the start-up’s 
entrepreneur, some reasons for that choice. The Essay tests several 
hypotheses derived from the economic and entrepreneurship literatures 
about the benefits of in-house versus outside counsel in the unique context 
of start-up firms. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
The growing importance of in-house counsel has been the focus of 
academic study.1 Yet most of that work focuses on in-house counsel at 
large corporations, and for understandable reasons: large corporations 
are where in-house counsel are most likely to be found. But the 
question remains whether in-house counsel are also gaining traction at 
start-up companies. This Essay is the first to examine, using responses 
to online surveys, whether start-ups also use in-house counsel. It also 
explores, from the vantage point of the start-up’s entrepreneur, some 
reasons for that choice. The Essay is limited in its scope of data 
collection and thus the conclusions that can be drawn; however, the 
survey responses allow me to test several hypotheses derived from the 
 
 1. See infra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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economic and entrepreneurship literatures about the benefits of in-house 
versus outside counsel in the unique context of start-up firms. 
The most salient results of my study are as follows. First, as 
expected, most entrepreneurs who responded to the online survey did 
not employ full-time in-house counsel. For those start-ups, the most 
common reason given was that an in-house attorney was not cost-
justified at this stage in the company’s development. The second most 
common reason was that outside counsel offer more coverage than in-
house counsel. All other reasons for favoring outside counsel lagged 
behind these two reasons by a substantial margin.2  
For the smaller number of entrepreneurs who did employ full-time 
in-house counsel, the top explanation was in-house counsel’s perceived 
advantage over outside counsel in understanding the company’s 
business. In economics parlance, in-house counsel were seen as having 
lower information asymmetries about the start-up’s business than 
outside counsel. Other reasons given for hiring in-house counsel 
included their superior ability to monitor the inner workings of the 
company and their greater responsiveness to company demands. 
Through its original empirical evidence, this Essay contributes to 
the economic literature on information asymmetries and agency costs, 
the burgeoning literature on law and entrepreneurship,3 and the 
literature on the growing importance of in-house counsel generally. On 
the latter, this Essay is most similar to Steven Schwarcz’s terrific 
empirical paper on value creation by in-house counsel at large 
corporations.4  
Although this Essay is the first academic work exploring in-house 
counsel in the start-up context, it is admittedly only a limited start. 
Considering the timeline for completing the Essay,5 online surveys 
were chosen as a means of soliciting data over face-to-face interviews 
or phone calls, which could have led to more participation and deeper 
questioning. To encourage busy entrepreneurs to respond to online 
surveys, I promised complete anonymity and confidentiality to 
respondents. However, these promises prevented me from knowing 
which entrepreneurs responded to the survey and which did not. The 
complete anonymity also prevented me from matching entrepreneurs to 
 
 2. See infra Part III for a summary of the main empirical results of the 
survey. 
 3. See Darian M. Ibrahim & D. Gordon Smith, Entrepreneurs on Horseback: 
Reflections on the Organization of Law, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 71, 82–83 n.65 (2008) 
(citing examples of academic work that fit within the “law and entrepreneurship” 
genre). 
 4. Steven L. Schwarcz, To Make or to Buy: In-House Lawyering and Value 
Creation, 33 J. CORP. L. 497 (2008). 
 5. This Essay is part of the 2011 Wisconsin Law Review Symposium. 
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responses, which meant I could not dig deeper into those companies’ 
characteristics (e.g., age, industry, and revenue) to draw more nuanced 
conclusions about the types of start-ups using in-house counsel. Also, 
while a more minor point, for simplicity this Essay frames the choice 
between in-house and outside counsel as a binary choice (i.e., the start-
up is presented as having only one or the other, when in reality even a 
start-up with in-house counsel may need outside counsel for some legal 
issues).6  
With these caveats in mind, this Essay proceeds as follows. Part I 
sets forth some theory about in-house counsel as well as several 
hypotheses about an entrepreneur’s choice between in-house and 
outside counsel. Part II discusses the collection of original survey data 
to test these hypotheses, including my methodology and its potential 
weaknesses. Part III presents the empirical results matched to the 
earlier hypotheses. Part IV discusses two attendant issues that were not 
the main focus of this Essay, but are nonetheless interesting and present 
opportunities for further study. Part V is an appendix presenting the 
original survey and raw data. 
I. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Start-up companies are unique firms. As Joseph Bankman and Ron 
Gilson describe it, “[i]n Silicon Valley, the defining myth takes as its 
stage David Packard’s or Steve Jobs’ garage. . .. [W]ith nothing but an 
idea and strength of character, [the entrepreneur] leaves his job with an 
established company, starts a firm that becomes an industry leader, and 
in the process becomes fabulously wealthy.”7 Start-ups start small but, 
should all go as planned, grow large. Their financing comes from 
increasingly sophisticated and well-funded sources—friends and family, 
then angel investors, venture capitalists, and finally the public should 
the start-up make an initial public offering.8 
Companies, including start-ups, obtain their legal services in a 
variety of ways. Small firms such as a local restaurant may use local 
attorneys and family friends, while large corporations hire the largest, 
most prestigious law firms in the world. But large corporations have 
 
 6. The data suggest that in-house counsel at start-ups are primarily used for 
transactional and regulatory work, while less so for litigation. This finding is consistent 
with prior academic work on the type of work performed by in-house counsel at large 
corporations. See Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 498. 
 7. Joseph Bankman & Ronald J. Gilson, Why Start-Ups?, 51 STAN. L. REV. 
289, 289–90 (1999). 
 8. See Darian M. Ibrahim, Should Angel-Backed Start-ups Reject Venture 
Capital? 101 (Univ. of Wis. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 1170, 2011), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1919139. 
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also increasingly internalized their legal services by employing one or 
sometimes even a small army of in-house counsel.9 In-house counsel 
are perceived as having several advantages for large firms; further, the 
in-house attorney can play many roles inside a corporation.10 
Many of these large corporations with an army of in-house counsel 
were once start-ups themselves. At some point in their development 
they decided to obtain at least some of their legal services from in-
house counsel as opposed to outside law firms. When did that occur? 
And why? This Essay proposes some hypotheses for the use, or non-
use, of in-house counsel at start-up companies that have received at 
least $5 million of venture capital financing (typically one round).11 
What follows are hypotheses, derived from the economic and 
entrepreneurship literatures, about the use of in-house counsel at start-
ups. 
A. General Hypothesis: Most Start-ups Will Not Have In-house 
Counsel 
My general hypothesis is that most start-ups, even those that have 
received venture capital financing, will not have full-time in-house 
counsel. For purposes of my survey, participants were told that in-
house counsel did not include an employee with law training who might 
answer legal questions on an informal basis. The next set of hypotheses 
more specifically delve into reasons for the general hypothesis. 
B. Hypotheses for Start-ups without In-house Counsel 
1. HYPOTHESIS 2.1: IN-HOUSE COUNSEL ARE NOT COST-JUSTIFIED 
Start-ups are notoriously cash-strapped. Expenses are heavily 
scrutinized and a start-up’s main goal is to use its limited funds to 
 
 9. See, e.g., Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional 
Judgment and Organizational Reputation, 64 IND. L.J. 479, 481 (1989) (“Corporate 
leaders report their greater reliance on corporate legal departments and praise the 
departments’ improving quality.”); Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 498 (“There has been a 
substantial shift towards more in-house lawyer transactional work in the past decade 
. . ..”). 
 10. See generally Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General 
Counsel, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 955 (2005). 
 11. See Darian M. Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 717, 734 (2010) (typical round of venture capital financing “has spiked from 
$2 million to upwards of $5 million”). Venture capitalists stage their financing and 
provide several rounds should the start-up progress according to certain benchmarks 
and milestones. See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons 
from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1078–81 (2003).  
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develop or grow its product or service. As a result, legal and other 
needs may be seen as a luxury a start-up cannot afford. For example, in 
their important study of patenting among start-ups, Stuart Graham, Rob 
Merges, Pam Samuelson, and Ted Sichelman found that “the cost of 
getting a patent is the most common reason cited for not patenting a 
major technology.”12 Similarly, some start-ups look to exchange stock 
for legal services to reduce cash outlays.13 
Once start-ups are able to obtain venture capital, they have more 
funds at their disposal. Still, venture capitalists do not wish to have 
their money used in imprudent manners and employ various 
mechanisms to reduce the agency costs that may arise after funding.14 
Venture capitalists want their funds dedicated to immediately growing 
the company and may feel that full-time in-house counsel are not 
warranted. For these reasons, Hypotheses 2.1 predicts that most 
entrepreneurs who do not hire in-house counsel will cite cost as an 
important consideration. 
2. HYPOTHESIS 2.2: OUTSIDE ATTORNEYS OFFER MORE COVERAGE 
Outside law firms have multiple attorneys, each with their own 
areas of expertise and specialization.15 Hiring a full-service law firm 
allows a client to tap into that varied expertise and cover more of its 
legal needs. In addition, corporate law firms bring to bear their past 
experience working with companies who have progressed through the 
life cycles the start-up will encounter. 
 
 12. Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent 
System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 
1310 (2009). 
 13. See Casey W. Baker, Incubating Golden Eggs: Why Attorney Ethics 
Rules May Stifle Small Business Development, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 507, 521 
(2007) (“More and more, attorneys and law firms are exchanging their services for 
equity positions in their business clients instead of cash.”); Gwyneth E. McAlpine, 
Getting a Piece of the Action: Should Lawyers Be Allowed to Invest in Their Clients’ 
Stock?, 47 UCLA L. REV. 549, 557 (1999) (“Many start-up companies cannot afford to 
pay high legal fees because they do not yet have a product with which to generate 
revenue. Instead of cash, they can offer their lawyers equity.”). 
 14. See Darian M. Ibrahim, Debt as Venture Capital, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1169, 1206 (“[I]f [venture capitalists] can employ venture debt to force interest 
payments, lessen burn rates, and reduce financial slack on the margins, it helps them 
monitor entrepreneurs and reduces agency costs.”). 
 15. See Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A 
Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 1868–69 (2008) 
(“[As of 2000] large law firm lawyers comprised 10.5% of the U.S. legal 
profession.”); cf. Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749 
(arguing that big law firms are a fundamentally flawed business model and predicting 
dire consequences for firms that fail to adapt to the changing corporate landscape). 
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This wide array of experience that outside counsel can offer a 
start-up is attractive to an entrepreneur. The needs of a growing 
company change quickly, and a start-up might require diverse services 
that only a large law firm can provide. Further, entrepreneurs might 
lack not only legal but also business experience, and value input from 
experienced corporate lawyers who have helped other start-ups grow. 
For these reasons, Hypothesis 2.2 predicts that entrepreneurs who 
prefer outside law firms will point to their perceived expertise and 
breadth of coverage as important considerations.  
3. HYPOTHESIS 2.3: OUTSIDE ATTORNEYS ARE MORE INDEPENDENT/ 
OBJECTIVE 
 Because outside law firms have multiple clients, their billings 
and livelihoods are less dependent on pleasing any one particular client. 
Conversely, in-house counsel have all their eggs in one basket, and 
therefore are at greater risk of telling management what they think they 
want to hear.16 Entrepreneurs might prefer to hear both positive and 
negative aspects about their business and legal challenges from a neutral 
source in order to remain competitive. Thus, Hypothesis 2.3 predicts 
that entrepreneurs who rely on outside counsel could believe that these 
attorneys are more independent and objective.  
4. HYPOTHESIS 2.4: OUTSIDE ATTORNEYS WILL ENHANCE OUR 
REPUTATION 
In his classic work on value creation by business lawyers, Ron 
Gilson notes that business lawyers “commonly play the role of 
reputational intermediary,”17 renting their established reputations to 
clients who are less established. Karl Okamoto follows Gilson’s work 
with an empirical test of the reputation-intermediary theory, breaking 
business lawyers into two categories: in-house and outside counsel.18 
Like Gilson, Okamoto observes that “clients who are unable to 
effectively bond their own performance resort to high reputation 
intermediaries to rent the intermediary’s reputation as a bond.”19 
Okamoto then theorizes that, unlike other business lawyers, in-house 
 
 16. See John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in Lawyer 
Independence: Lawyer Equity Investments in Clients, 81 TEX. L. REV. 405, 517 (2002) 
(“The danger of impaired judgment of the in-house counsel may exist.”). 
 17. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and 
Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 290 (1984). 
 18. Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REV. 
15 (1995). 
 19. Id. at 26. 
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counsel are not a good reputational intermediary because they have only 
one client, and thus “third parties will rationally discount [their] 
independence due to the risk of capture.”20 Conversely, because outside 
counsel have multiple clients, they can play the role of reputational 
intermediary. Using a data set of corporations filing for public offerings 
of securities, Okamoto finds empirical support for these assertions.21  
Start-up companies have sparse track records, and are thus in 
greater need of reputational intermediaries than the corporations 
Okamoto studied. Because the reputation of outside law firms is 
enhanced by their success with past clients and ability to attract top 
legal talent, Hypothesis 2.4 predicts that entrepreneurs who prefer 
outside counsel will perceive these attorneys as able to enhance their 
standing in the business community. 
5. HYPOTHESIS 2.5: OUTSIDE ATTORNEYS CAN CONNECT US TO ANGELS 
AND VENTURE CAPITALISTS 
While the prior hypothesis is that outside counsel can enhance a 
start-up’s reputation with any third party, one third party of particular 
importance to start-ups is the outside investor. Angel investors and 
venture capitalists are vital to the life of a start-up,22 and entrepreneurs 
spend considerable time trying to find and sell these investors on their 
companies.  
In his important work on Silicon Valley law firms, Mark Suchman 
suggests that in addition to their traditional functions, outside counsel 
play “matchmaker” between start-ups and venture capitalists.23 In other 
words, outside counsel, as repeat players in the entrepreneurial finance 
game, “channel[] start-ups to ‘appropriate’ venture capital funds.”24 
Consequently, Hypothesis 2.5 is that entrepreneurs who prefer outside 
counsel will do so in part because these attorneys can connect them to 
investors. 
 
 20. Id. at 28. 
 21. Id. at 38 (“The principal finding from the data is the existence of 
segmentation in the market for legal services based on the value of reputation. [Clients] 
who have relied on the technical competence of their corporate counsel in contexts 
where verification and reputational bonding are not needed turn to outside counsel when 
they are.”). 
 22. See Ibrahim, supra note 8, at 103–04. 
 23. Mark C. Suchman, Dealmakers and Counselors: Law Firms as 
Intermediaries in the Development of Silicon Valley, in UNDERSTANDING SILICON 
VALLEY: THE ANATOMY OF AN ENTREPRENEURIAL REGION 71, 89 (Martin Kenney ed., 
2000). 
 24. Id. 
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B. Hypotheses for Start-ups with In-house Counsel 
The preceding hypotheses all provide reasons that entrepreneurs 
may eschew in-house counsel at the start-up stage. However, there are 
good reasons why entrepreneurs may hire in-house counsel even before 
becoming large corporations. Those reasons form the hypotheses that 
follow. 
1. HYPOTHESIS 3.1: IN-HOUSE COUNSEL WILL BETTER UNDERSTAND 
OUR BUSINESS 
In his empirical paper on in-house counsel at large corporations, 
Schwarcz predicts that outside counsel will have steeper learning curves 
than in-house counsel when it comes to understanding the company’s 
business.25 In economic terms, in-house counsel have lower information 
asymmetries when it comes to understanding their clients’ businesses 
and thus more effectively serve their legal needs.26 Although the outside 
attorneys Schwarcz surveyed did not believe this was a significant 
issue,27 their answers could be somewhat self-serving.  
Due to their high-tech nature, start-ups may present even greater 
information asymmetries to outside counsel. These unique companies 
are often working in cutting-edge fields such as software, 
biotechnology, and clean energy. These fields require lawyers that 
know the intricate regulatory and competitive landscapes that are 
unique to each field. Having a competent lawyer who focuses solely on 
that start-up may prove to be a competitive advantage. For these 
reasons, Hypothesis 3.1 predicts that entrepreneurs who hire in-house 
counsel will perceive these attorneys as better positioned to understand 
their business. 
2. HYPOTHESIS 3.2: IN-HOUSE COUNSEL WILL BE MORE 
RESPONSIVE/TIMELY 
Schwarcz also predicts that in-house counsel “are generally more 
responsive to and can better communicate with the ‘client’ than outside 
counsel.”28 This may be because of the “physical proximity,” with in-
house counsel and company management “having offices in the same 
building if not on the same floor.”29 It may also be because 
 
 25. Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 503–04. 
 26. Id. at 525. 
 27. Id. at 552. 
 28. Id. at 509. 
 29. Id.  
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management feels more comfortable communicating with in-house 
counsel due to their repeat interactions. Therefore, Hypothesis 3.2 
predicts that entrepreneurs who hire in-house counsel will perceive 
those attorneys as being more responsive/timely than outside counsel.  
3. HYPOTHESIS 3.3: IN-HOUSE COUNSEL CAN BETTER MONITOR THE 
INNER WORKINGS OF OUR COMPANY 
Economic theory would suggest that full-time employees of a 
company are better able to monitor the company’s inner workings than 
an outsider hired on an intermittent basis. And greater monitoring can 
reduce agency costs. Translating these general theories to the choice 
between in-house and outside counsel, Schwarcz notes that there are 
two kinds of agency costs that in-house counsel can potentially 
mitigate—the first is misbehavior by company managers, while the 
second is conflicts with outside counsel.30 Because start-ups may not 
have significant need for outside counsel if in-house counsel are 
employed, the most relevant agency cost for my purposes is 
misbehavior by company managers.  
As Schwarcz observes, “[i]n-house counsel’s informal day-to-day 
interactions with other corporate employees give them access to 
information through back channels that would rarely, if ever, be 
available to outside counsel.”31 As a result, in-house counsel may be 
able to identify and head-off legal and other problems at an earlier stage 
than outside counsel. For these reasons, Hypothesis 3.3 predicts that 
entrepreneurs who hire in-house counsel will consider it important that 
these attorneys are better able to monitor the inner workings of the 
company than outside counsel. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
A. Data Gathering 
To test the hypotheses set forth in Part I, original data were 
gathered through online surveys. The first step was to determine a 
sample population. I chose venture capital-backed start-ups because 
they are important drivers of economic growth and job creation in the 
U.S. economy.32 Further, their use of in-house counsel has been 
 
 30. Id. at 505. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, National Venture Capital 
Association Releases Recommendations to Restore Liquidity in the U.S. Venture 
Capital Industry (Apr. 29, 2009), available at http://www.dcm.com/dnld/news/ 
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unexplored in the academic literature. The VentureXpert database 
provided by Thomson Financial was used to identify these companies. 
To limit the sample size, I included only companies formed between 
2006 and 2008 that received at least $5 million in venture capital 
funding since their formation. After reviewing the list, I noticed a 
number of venture capital firms themselves were included in the 
sample. Because operating firms and not their financiers were the target 
population, I removed all venture capital firms from the sample. This 
led to an original total of 1,678 start-ups to attempt to survey. 
The next step was to distribute online surveys to these start-ups. 
The website SurveyMonkey (www.surveymonkey.com) was selected to 
distribute the surveys and collect the data.33 SurveyMonkey enables 
easy preparation and distribution of surveys, allows survey participants 
to quickly submit information, and offers tools to neatly analyze and 
report data. As mentioned earlier, online surveying, and 
SurveyMonkey in particular, was chosen as a means of collecting data 
for reasons of time and expediency. The survey was kept short, with an 
estimated response time of approximately 5-10 minutes, to maximize 
the breadth of participation even though this sacrificed depth. 
The survey was e-mailed to the chief executive officer or someone 
in a similar position at each start-up. In short, a high-ranking officer 
was selected as the crude approximation of the start-up’s 
“entrepreneur.” The e-mail addresses that we received for each start-up 
from VentureXpert varied. For some, the CEO’s name and e-mail 
address were listed, in which case the CEO received the survey. In 
many cases the CEO was not listed, however, and the next highest-
ranking titled officer (e.g., CFO, COO) was chosen, followed by a 
board member if no officers were listed. If no one from the board of 
directors was listed, the survey went to the highest-ranking employee 
listed (e.g., a vice president).  
The surveys were originally distributed on June 13, 2011. Three 
reminder e-mails were sent over the following month in an attempt to 
obtain more responses. Several e-mails bounced back, which is to be 
expected as many start-ups fail or are acquired by larger companies. 
We ultimately received seventy one responses out of 1,460 surveys sent 
(excluding bounced e-mails), resulting in a response rate of 4.86%. The 
 
NVCARecommendations042909.pdf (“[I]n 2008 public companies that were once 
venture-backed accounted for more than 12 million U.S. jobs and $2.9 trillion in 
revenues, which equates to 21 percent of U.S. GDP.”). 
 33. Web-based surveys are now commonly used for data collection. See, e.g., 
D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
1055, 1120 (2010) (“The data for this study comes from an online survey, which was 
launched at www.surveymonkey.com.”). 
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response rate seems to be low compared to other surveys of this type.34 
Online surveys often wind up in recipients’ spam folders and may not 
be treated that seriously, especially if distributed through a commonly 
available site such as SurveyMonkey. The recipients were too 
numerous to follow up with phone calls or attempts for face-to-face 
interviews, as others have done to encourage participation.35 It is also 
important to keep in mind that these are CEOs or the like at high-
pressured start-ups, not the type of people likely to have free time for 
survey requests. 
B. Selection Issues 
There were several issues with the survey methodology that could 
have introduced selection bias to the results. As a general matter, 
“[s]urvey methodology is potentially subject to flaws. . .. [and is] 
dependent on the precise wording, format, and context of the survey 
questions.”36 Further, survey responses come only from those who 
voluntarily respond to the survey request. There could be systematic 
differences between start-ups whose entrepreneurs responded to my 
survey and those whose entrepreneurs did not. The surveys were only 
sent to entrepreneurs, while many questions would have been better 
answered by lawyers. Interviewing only entrepreneurs also raised the 
possibility of biased responses where indicators of creativity and 
innovation were concerned. Finally, entrepreneurs may have refrained 
from providing information that they felt would reflect negatively on 
themselves, their start-up, or the industry they work in. Thus, there is a 
possibility that they provided responses they believed were socially 
desirable, even if less accurate.  
Although VentureXpert is my preferred database for collecting 
information about venture capital-backed start-ups, there are other 
 
 34. Graham et al., supra note 12, at 1272 (conducting large-scale patent 
survey with response rates of 10.6% from Dun & Bradstreet database and 17.9% from 
VentureXpert database); Lawrence P. McLellan, Expanding the Use of Collaborative 
Law: Consideration of Its Use in a Legal Aid Program for Resolving Family Law 
Disputes, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 465, 474 (noting response rate of 7.5% using 
SurveyMonkey); Tse-Hua Shih & Xitao Fan, Comparing Response Rates from Web 
and Mail Surveys: A Meta-Analysis, 20 FIELD METHODS 249, 257 (2008) (finding the 
mean response rate for web-based surveys is 34%); Sokol, supra note 32, at 1120 
(noting response rate of 19% using SurveyMonkey).  
 35. Brian Broughman & Jesse Fried, Renegotiation of Cash Flow Rights in 
the Sale of VC-Backed Firms, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 384, 387–88 (2010), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=956243 (detailing the authors’ multi-pronged approach to obtain 
responses that led to a roughly 40% response rate). 
 36. Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 502. 
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databases that might offer different advantages.37 Keeping answers 
anonymous made it impossible to match entrepreneurs and responses; 
this prevented me from going back into VentureXpert and matching 
responses with specific firm types. It could be that in-house counsel 
usage is a function of age, revenue vs. pre-revenue, or industry. Yet I 
was unable to answer these questions in this limited survey. Finally, 
choosing only start-ups formed between 2006 and 2008 with at least 
five million dollars in venture capital funding was somewhat arbitrary. 
The choice to survey these companies and not others might affect the 
results because start-ups thrive or fail more prevalently with cyclical 
macroeconomic conditions.  
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Keeping in mind the low response rate and selection effects 
discussed in the previous Part, the Essay will now highlight the main 
empirical results of my survey. It will also analyze those results against 
the hypotheses set forth in Part I. 
A. General Hypothesis: Most Start-ups Will Not Have In-house 
Counsel: Comparison with Empirical Results 
The data were consistent with the hypothesis that most 
entrepreneurs will not hire full-time in-house counsel. Almost 72% of 
respondents did not have in-house counsel, while only 28% did. Even 
entrepreneurs who reported having in-house counsel used them 
primarily for transactional and regulatory work. Over 63% of 
respondents estimated that the primary focus of their in-house attorney 
was transactional work,38 over 31% said regulatory matters,39 and only 
6% litigation.40 Likewise, the in-house counsel in Schwarcz’s study did 
 
 37. See Graham et al., supra note 12, at 1269–71 (combining databases from 
VentureXpert and Dun & Bradstreet for the authors’ patent survey of 15,000 firms). 
 38. Transactional work was defined by the survey to include “contracts, 
employment agreements, and corporate governance matters such as fund-raising 
documents and stock option plans.” See infra Part V.  
 39. Regulatory matters were defined by the survey to include “regulatory 
compliance, and working with governmental bodies including the Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), [and] Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA).” See infra Part V. 
 40. Litigation was defined by the survey to include “mediation, arbitration, 
and courtroom representation.” See infra Part V. 
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“not address such non-transactional lawyering roles as litigation, 
lobbying, or compliance work.”41  
For purposes of my survey, participants were told that in-house 
counsel did not include an employee with law training who might 
answer legal questions on an informal basis. It should be noted that 
28.3% of respondents without in-house counsel gave as one reason for 
that choice that they “have an employee with legal training that plays 
the role of in-house attorney when needed.” Only one respondent, or 
2.2% of the sample, listed that as their most important reason for 
eschewing in-house counsel. 
B. Hypotheses for Start-ups without In-house Counsel: Comparison 
with Empirical Results 
Start-ups without in-house counsel were asked to answer a series 
of questions to probe their decision to rely solely on outside counsel. 
The results are reported below.  
 
1. HYPOTHESIS 2.1: IN-HOUSE COUNSEL ARE NOT COST-JUSTIFIED  
When asked to indicate all of their reasons for not having in-house 
counsel from a series of choices, almost 83% of entrepreneurs 
responded that it was not cost-justified, making it the most common 
reason given by far. In the next question, entrepreneurs were asked to 
rank their reasons for not having in-house counsel. Again, “not cost-
justified” topped the list, garnering over 61% of the total first-place 
votes. Therefore, the perceived cost of compensating in-house counsel 
appears to be a significant factor to entrepreneurs who eschew them. 
Hypothesis 2.1, that in-house counsel are not cost-justified, is 
consistent with the data.  
Interestingly, entrepreneurs who eschewed in-house counsel were 
also polled on the extent of their legal needs. Over 82% claimed their 
start-up has “significant legal needs.” Further, when asked how much 
they spent on legal services in 2010, more than 67% claimed that it was 
 
 41. Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 499. My results suggest in-house counsel in 
start-ups might focus more on “compliance” work than the in-house counsel in 
Schwarcz’s study. Over 30% of my respondents listed regulatory matters as the 
primary focus for their in-house counsel. It is important to note that my results could 
differ from Schwarcz’s if a large percentage of my sample were biotechnology or clean 
technology companies with significant regulatory issues. In addition, my results might 
reflect the greater tendency of start-ups to file for patent protection as opposed to non-
high-tech companies. See Graham et al., supra note 12, at 1302 (comparing the average 
number of patents/applications held by start-ups across several industries). 
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over $70,000. While salaries for in-house counsel can vary 
significantly, in today’s economy at a young start-up, it would seem 
that $70,000 could make an attractive salary, especially if combined 
with stock options.42 However, to offer the experience and coverage a 
start-up might need would require a more seasoned attorney, who 
would likely charge well over $70,000 as a base salary, especially in 
Silicon Valley. 
2. HYPOTHESIS 2.2: OUTSIDE ATTORNEYS OFFER MORE COVERAGE 
When asked to check all of the reasons for relying on outside 
counsel, over 60% of respondents checked that outside counsel offers 
more coverage, making it the second most common reason given for 
preferring outside counsel. In the next question, when respondents 
ranked their reasons for relying on outside counsel, “more coverage” 
garnered second place. Over 28% of respondents listed coverage as 
their most important reason. Therefore, the data are consistent with the 
hypothesis that the perceived depth of specialization and coverage 
offered by outside counsel is an important factor to entrepreneurs. The 
data support the view that start-ups require diversified legal services 
that only a large law firm can provide. 
3. HYPOTHESIS 2.3: OUTSIDE COUNSEL ARE MORE 
INDEPENDENT/OBJECTIVE. 
When asked to check all of their reasons for relying on outside 
counsel, only 13% of respondents included “more 
independent/objective” in their responses. Further, only 4% of 
respondents believed that the greater independence/objectivity of 
outside counsel was the primary reason to hire outside counsel over in-
house counsel. Therefore, this hypothesis was not supported by the data 
and can be rejected.  
 
 42. Interestingly, only 6.3% of start-ups with in-house counsel used stock 
options as the primary means of compensating them, and only 12.5% used an 
approximately equal combination of stock options and salary. Conversely, 81.3% of 
entrepreneurs reported that their in-house counsel’s compensation came primarily in the 
form of salary. Unfortunately I did not ask those entrepreneurs whether stock options 
were still a component of the attorney’s compensation, even if salary was its primary 
component. See DeMott, supra note 10, at 963 (“[A] general counsel’s compensation 
package often includes components not otherwise available, such as stock options and 
other forms of compensation based on an employer’s equity securities.”); Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & 
FIN. 486, 502 (2007) (finding that transactional lawyers add value by acting as 
reputational intermediaries); Suchman, supra note 23, at 89. 
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4. HYPOTHESIS 2.4: OUTSIDE COUNSEL WILL ENHANCE OUR 
REPUTATION  
When asked to check all of their reasons for relying on outside 
counsel, only 8.7% of respondents perceived outside counsel as 
enhancing their reputations with third parties. Further, in terms of rank, 
only 2% of respondents saw reputational enhancement as the primary 
reason to choose outside counsel over in-house counsel. Therefore, the 
reputational intermediary hypothesis was not supported by the data. In 
his empirical work on in-house counsel at large corporations, Schwarcz 
also found little support for the reputational intermediary hypothesis.43 
5. HYPOTHESIS 2.5: OUTSIDE COUNSEL CAN CONNECT US TO ANGELS 
AND VENTURE CAPITALISTS 
When asked to check all of their reasons for relying on outside 
counsel, only 4% included among their reasons that outside counsel 
could connect them to angel investors and venture capitalists. Further, 
no respondents listed this as the primary reason to hire outside counsel. 
It should be noted that all of the surveyed firms had attracted at least 
one round of venture capital funding, which could make them non-ideal 
respondents on this question. Still, based on the results of my survey, 
the “matchmaking” hypothesis was not supported by the data and can 
be rejected. This calls into question Suchman’s findings on Silicon 
Valley law firms as matchmakers to entrepreneurs and venture 
capitalists.44 However, there could be a time lag explanation here (i.e., 
lawyers could have served as important matchmakers in the past, but 
given technological advances and the like, they have more competition 
for that role today). 
B. Hypotheses for Start-ups with In-house Counsel: Comparison to 
Empirical Results 
Even though the survey data indicated that most start-ups do not 
have in-house counsel, we also collected data from several start-ups that 
did. Start-ups with full-time in-house counsel were asked to answer a 
series of questions probing the reasons for that choice. 
 
 43. Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 486, 502 (2007) (finding that transactional lawyers add value 
by acting as reputational intermediaries). 
 44. See Suchman, supra note 23, at 89. 
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1. HYPOTHESIS 3.1: IN-HOUSE COUNSEL WILL BETTER UNDERSTAND 
OUR BUSINESS 
When asked to check all of their reasons for employing in-house 
counsel, 93.8% of respondents included that in-house counsel can better 
understand the company’s business and therefore work more efficiently 
and cost-effectively. This made it the most common choice by far. 
When entrepreneurs were then asked to rank their reasons for hiring in-
house counsel, better understanding the company’s business again 
topped the list, garnering over 75% of the “most important” reason 
votes.45 Therefore, the data are consistent with the hypothesis that in-
house counsel have lower information asymmetries about a start-up’s 
business than outside counsel. 
2. HYPOTHESIS 3.2: IN-HOUSE COUNSEL WILL BE MORE 
RESPONSIVE/TIMELY 
Out of all their reasons for hiring in-house counsel, 56.3% of 
respondents included that an in-house attorney would be more timely 
and responsive than outside counsel. When asked to rank their reasons 
preferring in-house counsel, “more timely/responsive” garnered over 
13% of the “most important” reason votes. The data therefore appear 
to provide weak support for the hypothesis that entrepreneurs perceive 
in-house counsel as more responsive to the start-up’s needs than outside 
counsel. 
3. HYPOTHESIS 3.3: IN-HOUSE COUNSEL CAN BETTER MONITOR THE 
INNER WORKINGS OF OUR COMPANY 
When asked to include all of their reasons for hiring in-house 
counsel, 68.8% of respondents checked that in-house counsel would be 
better able to monitor the inner workings of the start-up than outside 
counsel. When asked to rank their reasons for hiring in-house counsel, 
the monitoring explanation garnered 12.5% of the “most important” 
reason votes. Therefore, the hypothesis that in-house counsel reduce 
 
 45. Unfortunately, I included two choices to this survey question that were 
substantially the same. The first choice read “Because an in-house attorney can better 
understand our business and therefore work more efficiently and cost effectively,” 
while the second read “Because an in-house attorney better understands our business 
than an outside attorney.” See infra Part V. For purposes of reporting the ranked 
results, the “most important” votes given on both of these questions were combined. 
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agency costs through superior monitoring was a hypothesis that had 
moderate support in the data. 
IV. ATTENDANT ISSUES FOR FURTHER STUDY 
The foregoing Part revealed the main results of my study and how 
they matched up with the hypotheses presented earlier. The Essay will 
now conclude by briefly discussing two attendant issues on which 
entrepreneurs were also surveyed that warrant further study. 
A. Attorney-Client Privilege and Board Seats 
As Schwarcz observes, “[a]lthough in-house counsel are 
theoretically afforded the same privilege as outside counsel, the 
privilege only applies to communications that constitute ‘legal’ rather 
than ‘business’ advice.”46 In-house counsel, especially at nascent start-
ups, may be asked to provide business advice as well as legal advice as 
a full-time member of the “team.” The issue of attorney-client privilege 
is further complicated if in-house counsel serve on the company’s board 
of directors, where business advice is what is called for.47 In-house 
counsel, it seems, would be more likely to sit on a start-up’s board than 
would outside counsel. Therefore, while it may be low on the list of 
considerations for a young company, start-ups may prefer outside 
counsel to in-house counsel to preserve attorney-client confidentiality. 
My survey asked entrepreneurs with in-house counsel whether they 
worried about in-house counsel compromising attorney-client privilege 
relative to outside counsel. Almost 94% of respondents said that they 
did not have this concern. In addition, the same percentage reported 
that their in-house counsel did not serve on the start-up’s board of 
directors. It stands to reason that if in-house counsel were more 
prevalent on start-up boards, attorney-client privilege could be a greater 
concern. But from my data, at least, preserving attorney-client privilege 
does not appear to give entrepreneurs a reason to favor outside counsel. 
 
 46. Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 512. 
 47. Janet J. Higley et al., Confidentiality of Communications by In-House 
Counsel for Financial Institutions, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 265, 287 (2002) (noting 
problems when in-house counsel also serves as a member of the board of directors of 
the corporation client); Susanna M. Kim, Dual Identities and Dueling Obligations: 
Preserving Independence in Corporate Representation, 68 TENN. L. REV. 179, 182 
(2001) (“One of the most controversial issues arising out of the context of corporate 
representation involves the corporate lawyer’s relationship vis-a-vis the board of 
directors.”). 
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B. “Rent-a-General Counsel” Law Firms. 
  To this point the Essay has presented only two means by which 
start-ups may obtain their legal services: in-house counsel or traditional 
outside law firms. But a third hybrid option is sprouting up as well. 
This option is a hybrid situated between the in-house counsel and 
traditional outside counsel. It is an outside law firm, but composed 
mostly of former in-house counsel. Sometimes referred to as “rent-a-
general counsel” or “legal outsourcing,”48 these innovative firms are as 
entrepreneurial as the start-ups they serve.  
Rent-a-GC firms recognize that start-ups (and other companies) 
may have legal needs that are too few to justify full-time in-house 
counsel, but also do not justify a traditional law firm’s steep hourly 
rates and learning curve. Rent-a-GC firms charge less than large law 
firms49 and are quicker to hit the ground running due to their attorneys’ 
prior in-house experience. Leading this entrepreneurial charge are firms 
such as Outside GC of Boston, The General Counsel, LLC of Southern 
California, and The General Counsel, Ltd. of Minneapolis, among 
others.50 
In order to investigate the rise of Rent-a-GC firms further, the 
survey asked all entrepreneurs whether they had ever used this type of 
firm. Over 87% of respondents reported that they had not. Of the 
almost 13% of respondents that had used such a firm, over half were 
“satisfied” with the firm’s performance, and another third were 
“somewhat” satisfied. Over 11% reported that they were “not 
satisfied” with their experience. Because so few respondents had used 
such a firm, these percentages are highly driven by a few responses and 
should be discounted accordingly. Further study should be done in this 
 
 48. This type of legal outsourcing is not to be confused with the legal 
outsourcing to other countries that Larry Ribstein discusses in his recent article on the 
decline of large law firms. Ribstein, supra note 15, at 766–67. 
 49. See Terry Carter, Outsiders Inside, 96 A.B.A. J., Feb. 2010, at 31 
(discussing that fees for rent-a-GC firms “typically run about a third of the going rate” 
of traditional law firms); Tonyia Sullivan, Small Businesses Save Money by Hiring 
Outsourced Counsel, AUSTIN BUS J. (Feb. 12, 2006, 11:00 PM), http:// 
www.bizjournals.com/Austin/stories/2006/02/13/focus3.html (noting that one Austin-
based outsourcing firm “provides legal services to clients at 30 percent to 40 percent 
less than what it would cost to employ a full-time general counsel”); Chad Eric Watt, 
General Counsel, Anyone? Outsourcing Is an Option, ORLANDO BUS. J. (May 13, 
2002, 12:00 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/orlando/stories/2002/05/13/focus1.html 
(“General Counsel Advisors typically charges 50-75 percent less than big law firms 
. . ..”). 
 50. See John Wallbillich, Rent-A-GC, WIREDGC (Dec. 12, 2005), http:// 
www.wiredgc.com/205/12/12/rent-a-gc. 
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area, as Rent-a-GC firms could present a promising middle ground by 
which start-ups obtain their legal services. 
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V. APPENDIX: SURVEY QUESTION AND ANSWERS 
Introductory Question 
Do you have an “in-house attorney,” meaning an attorney who works full 
time at your company? (NOTE: If you have an employee with law training that 
answers legal questions on an informal basis, but you do NOT have a formally 
designated in-house attorney, please answer “No.”) 
 
 
 
 
Questions for Companies With In-house Attorneys:  
Question #1: For the following question, please select the answer that 
best describes the primary focus of your in-house attorney. 
Answer Options Response 
Percent
Response Count 
Transactional work (e.g., contracts, employment 
agreements, and corporate governance matters such as 
fund-raising documents and stock option plans)
62.5% 10 
Litigation (including mediation, arbitration, and 
courtroom representation) 
6.3% 1 
Regulatory matters (e.g., regulatory compliance, and 
working with governmental bodies including the Patent 
and Trademark Office (PTO), Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), Food & Drug Administration 
(FDA)) 
31.3% 5 
 
Question # 2: Why did you hire an in-house attorney instead of relying on 
outside law firms? Choose all options that apply. 
Answer Options Response 
Percent
Response Count 
Because it’s generally cheaper to pay an in-house 
attorney greater than outside firms, which charge too 
much 
50.0% 8 
Because it’s cheaper to compensate an in-house attorney, 
as they can be paid with stock options
18.8% 3 
Because an in-house attorney can better understand my 
business and therefore work more efficiently and cost-
93.8% 15 
Answer Options Response 
Percent
Response Count 
Yes 28.2% 20 
No 71.8% 51 
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effectively
Because outside attorneys are not transparent in the fees 
they charge
0.0% 0 
Because an in-house attorney understands my business 
better than an outside attorney 
62.5% 10 
Because an in-house attorney would only have my 
company as a client and therefore be a stronger advocate 
for us 
31.3% 5 
Because an in-house attorney would be more responsive 
and timely
56.3% 9 
Because an in-house attorney would better be able to 
monitor the inner workings of my company
68.8% 11 
    Answered Question: 16 
 
Question # 3: Rank the reasons why you hired an in-house attorney by 
order of importance. However, ONLY rank the answers that you had checked 
in Question 2 above. 
Answered Question: 15 
 
Answer Options 1 Most 
Important 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Least 
Important 
Because it’s generally 
cheaper to pay an in-house 
attorney than outside 
counsel, which charge too 
much 
13% 13% 13% 7% 7% 0 0 7% 
Because it’s cheaper to 
compensate an in-house 
attorney, as they can be 
paid with stock options 
13% 7% 0 7% 0 0 7% 7% 
Because an in-house 
attorney can better 
understand my business and 
therefore work more 
efficiently and cost-
effectively 
53% 27% 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Because outside attorneys 
are not transparent in the 
fees they charge 
0 0 0 7% 0 7
% 
13
% 
0 
Because an in-house 
attorney understands my 
business better than an 
outside attorney
40% 27% 7% 7% 0 0 0 0 
Because an in-house 
attorney would only have 
my company as a client and 
therefore be a stronger 
advocate 
0 0 20% 0 7% 0 7% 7% 
Because an in-house 
attorney would be more 
responsive and timely 
20% 33% 7% 7% 0 0 7% 0 
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Because an in-house 
attorney would better be 
able to monitor the inner 
workings of my company 
20% 27% 33% 0 0 7
% 
0 0 
 
Question #4: What method of compensation makes up the majority of 
your in-house attorney’s salary package? 
Answer Options Response 
Percent
Response Count 
Salary 81.3% 13
Stock Options 6.3% 1
Approximately 50/50 combination of Salary and Stock 
Options 
12.5% 2 
 
Question #5: Is your in-house attorney also on the company’s board of 
directors? 
Answer Options Response 
Percent
Response Count 
Yes 6.3% 1
No 93.8% 15
 
Question #6: Do you worry about an in-house attorney compromising 
attorney-client privilege relative to an outside attorney? 
Answer Options Response 
Percent
Response Count 
Yes 6.3% 1
No 93.8% 15
 
 
Questions for Companies Without In-House Counsel  
Question #1: Does your company have significant legal needs? 
Answer Options Response 
Percent
Response Count 
Yes 82.6% 38
No 17.4% 8
 
Question #2: How much did your company spend on legal services in 
2010? 
Answer Options Response 
Percent
Response Count 
<$10,000 2.2% 1
$10,000-$30,000 8.7% 4
$30,000-$50,000 15.2% 7
$50,000-$70,000 6.5% 3
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>$70,000 67.4% 31
 
Question #3: What are your legal needs? Check all that apply. 
Answer Options Response 
Percent
Response Count 
Transactional work (e.g., contracts, employment 
agreements, and corporate governance matters such as 
fund-raising documents and stock option plans)
97.8% 45 
Litigation (including mediation, arbitration, and 
courtroom representation) 
21.7% 10 
Regulatory matters (e.g., regulatory compliance, and 
working with governmental bodies including the Patent 
and Trademark Office (PTO), Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), Food & Drug Administration (FDA))
76.1% 35 
 
Question #4: Why have you not hired an in-house attorney? Check all 
that apply. 
Answer Options Response 
Percent
Response Count 
An in-house attorney is not cost-justified at this stage in 
our company’s development 
82.6% 38 
We have an employee with legal training that plays the 
role of in-house attorney when needed
28.3% 13 
Outside attorneys do a better job because they have 
multiple attorneys who specialize in different areas of law
60.9% 28 
Outside attorneys are more responsive/timely 8.7% 4
Outside attorneys are more independent/objective 13.0% 6
Outside attorneys are better equipped to connect me to 
angel investors, venture capitalists, and others who can 
help further my company’s development
4.3% 2 
Outside attorneys enhance our company’s reputation with 
outside parties
8.7% 4 
 
 
 
Question #5: Rank the choices of your decision not to hire an in-house 
attorney and instead use outside counsel, in order of importance. However, 
ONLY rank the answers you selected in Question 4 above. 
Answer Options 1 Most 
Important 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Least 
Important 
An in-house attorney not cost-
justified at this stage in our 
company’s development 
61% 15
% 
4% 4% 0 2% 0 4% 
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We have an employee with 
legal training that plays the 
role of in-house attorney 
when needed
2% 22
% 
6.5
% 
0 0 4% 4
% 
6 
Outside attorneys do a better 
job because they have 
multiple attorneys who 
specialize in different areas of 
law 
28% 24
% 
22% 2% 0 0 2
% 
0 
Outside attorneys are more 
responsive/timely 
4% 9% 2% 6.5
%
4% 4% 2
%
6.5% 
Outside attorneys are more 
independent/objective 
4% 4% 4% 4% 13
%
0 4
%
4% 
Outside attorneys are better 
equipped to connect me to 
angel investors, venture 
capitalists, and others who 
can help further my 
company’s development 
0 4% 2% 0 4% 11
% 
4
% 
13% 
Outside attorneys enhance our 
company’s reputation with 
outside parties
2% 2% 6.5
% 
6.5
% 
2% 9% 4
% 
11% 
 
Question #6: Do you plan to hire an in-house attorney at some point in 
the company’s development? 
Answer Options Response Percent Response Count 
Yes 26.7% 12 
No 26.7% 12 
It depends on how large we grow 46.7% 21 
 
General Questions 
Question #1: Have you ever used a specialty “rent a general counsel” 
type law firm comprised of former general counsel as opposed to traditional 
law firm partners and associates? 
Answer Options Response 
Percent
Response Count 
Yes 12.9% 8
No 87.1% 54
 
Question #2: If you answered “Yes” to the question above, were you 
satisfied? 
Answer Options Response 
Percent
Response Count 
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Yes 55.6% 5
No 11.1% 1
Somewhat 33.3% 3
 
Question #3: In what order would you hire the following for future legal 
needs: 
Answer Options First-Most Likely to Hire Second Least Likely to Hire Response 
Count 
Outside law firm 80% 15% 5% 61 
In-house attorney 13% 46% 41% 61 
Rent a general counsel firm 7% 31% 62% 58 
   Answered Question: 62  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
